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Abstract 
Regional output per worker has converged across Chinese provinces in 1979-
1989. The estimated rate of convergence is 2.2 percent. This rate of convergence 
can be explained by neoclassical growth model conditional on assumptions 
about factor mobility and production elasticities. My empirical results show that 
capital mobility has been high across Chinese provinces and that the production 
elasticity of human capital is about twice as high as the production elasticity of 
physical capital. With less interprovincial capital flows as the result of an 
expected increase in fiscal decentralization, the rate of convergence of regional 




 1.  Introduction and Summary*  
Chinese provinces display large differences in growth rates and output per 
worker. Growth rates have differed by a factor of eight, and output per worker 
has differed by a factor of nine. However, these large differences have tended to 
decline over time, because poor provinces have grown faster than rich provinces 
since the beginning of economic reform in 1978. Figure 1 highlights this 
stylized fact as a negative correlation between output per worker in 1978 and 
average annual growth rates in 1978-1989.1 That is, regional output per worker 
has converged across Chinese provinces in 1978-1989.2 
The traditional neoclassical model of economic growth (Solow 1956, Mankiw 
et al. 1992) explains convergence of output per worker as an adjustment to a 
steady state, which is determined by the rate of factor accumulation. This model 
implies that the rate of convergence depends on specific parameters such as 
production elasticities, depreciation rates, and labor force growth. Because these 
parameters can be estimated, the neoclassical model can be used to derive a 
quantitative prediction for the rate of convergence that, in turn, can be compared 
                                           
*  This paper reports research undertaken in a project on "Decentralization and Enterprise 
Reform in China". I thank two anonymous referees and Martin Raiser for helpful 
comments on an earlier version. Financial support by the Volkswagen-Stiftung is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
1  The Appendix gives a definition of variables and the respective data sources. Two 
Appendix tables contain all the data used in this paper. The data refer to 29 Chinese 
provincial level localities, including 22 provinces, 3 municipalities under the central 
government, and 4 autonomous regions (Tibet is excluded due to data limitations). I refer 
to all these entities as provinces. 
2  Figure 1 actually reflects convergence and not Galton's fallacy (see Friedman (1992)) 
because the coefficient of variation of output per worker declines from 0.70 in 1978 to 




with the observed rate of convergence. Thus, the neoclassical model of 
economic growth may provide a reasonable account of the convergence of 
output per worker across Chinese provinces if the theoretically predicted rate of 
convergence closely matches the observed rate of convergence. 
One serious objection can be raised against the use of the neoclassical growth 
model for an explanation of convergence in the case of China. China is a 
socialist economy where the basic principles underlying the neoclassical growth 
model may not apply, namely the maximization of life time consumption by 
consumers and the maximization of profits by firms. However, one could 
imagine a benevolent social planner who seeks to maximize the utility of the 
representative family. Despite its lack of realism, from a purely theoretical point 
of view such an assumption guarantees that the central planning solution of the 
model will be the same as that for the decentralized economy if the planner has 
the same form of preferences as those assumed before (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
1995). Therefore, the application of the neoclassical growth model in the case of 
China is not as far fetched as it may appear at first sight.3 
My empirical results show that the observed rate of convergence across 
Chinese provinces is rather slow, namely 2.2 percent. The neoclassical model 
can explain this rate of convergence if there is no capital mobility across 
Chinese provinces and if the production elasticity of capital is about 0.75. But I 
find that capital mobility appears to be high, because saving and investment 
                                           
3    Another objection is that China is a developing country where the neoclassical 
assumption of full employment may be misleading. This objection is more difficult to 
reject as long as one cannot clarify whether China actually suffers from an 
unemployment equilibrium. For the neoclassical model to be applicable, it is sufficient to 
assume that there are forces which tend to equalize marginal factor products with real 
factor earnings. Such forces could be initiated by a market process, or, in the case of 




rates are uncorrelated across Chinese provinces. If one, therefore, assumes that 
Chinese provinces are open economies, the neoclassical model predicts that 
capital should move quickly to equalize marginal products and, hence, that 
convergence of output per worker will be rapid. 
I can reconcile the observed and the theoretically predicted rate of 
convergence by introducing human capital as a third factor of production, and 
by assuming that human capital is immobile. If so, interprovincial borrowing 
would be possible to finance accumulation of physical capital, but not 
accumulation of human capital. With the human capital augmented neoclassical 
model, I find that the production elasticity of human capital is about twice as 
high as the production elasticity of physical capital, and that the combined 
production elasticity of all capital is about 0.8. 
These findings imply that convergence of output per worker across Chinese 
provinces has been supported by high interprovincial physical capital mobility 
since the beginning of economic reforms in 1978. Capital mobility has allowed 
poor regions to maintain a high rate of physical capital accumulation despite low 
saving rates. But interprovincial capital mobility is likely to decline once fiscal 
decentralization gains further momentum in the course of Chinese economic 
reforms, at least as long as an efficient domestic capital market is largely 
missing. As a result, regional convergence of output per worker would be likely 
to decline as well. 
2.  The Rate of Convergence: Theory and Evidence 
Suppose that all Chinese provinces have access to the same technology and 
Chinese workers across provinces share the same set of preferences, which have 
the same form as those of the benevolent social planner. Then, the traditional 




worker to a common steady state. Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), 
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where () YL
i /  is output per worker in province i , Bis a constant term, and λ is 
the convergence rate. That is, the growth rate of output per worker is a negative 
function of initial output per worker. 
A regression of the average annual growth rate of output per worker in 1978-
1989 on output per worker in 1978 across the 29 Chinese provinces shown in 
Figure 1 delivers the following result (standard errors in parenthesis): 
(2)  () () ( ) ln / ln / . . ln / YL YL YL 1989 1978 1978 193 022 − = −  
 (0.43)  (0.06) 
No. of observations = 29. 
R
2  = 0.28 
s ee ...   = 0.17 




  . 
The point estimate of the convergence rate of 2.2 percent lies within the range 
that is known from other empirical studies of convergence.4 A λ of about 
2 percent implies that convergence towards the steady state will proceed rather 
slowly, because in this case half of the departure from a given steady state would 
remain for 35 years. Two questions arise. First, whether any theoretical 
parameterization of the neoclassical model would actually produce a 
                                           




convergence rate in the range of 2  percent and, second, whether such a 
parameterization is indeed supported empirically for the case of China.. 
The theoretical convergence rate can be derived as follows. The neoclassical 
model takes the rates of saving, population growth and technological progress as 
exogenous. Output (Y ) is produced under constant returns to scale with two 
inputs, capital (K) and labor (L), which are paid their marginal products. 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, output at time t is given by: 
(3)  () YKA L tt t t =
− α α 1  , 0<α <1 . 
A, the level of technology, and L are assumed to grow exogenously at rates g 
and n, so  AA e t
gt = 0  and LL e t
nt = 0 . Hence, the number of effective units of 
labor,  A L tt , grows at rate g n + . Furthermore, assuming constant saving (S Y / ) 
and depreciation rates (δ = DK / ), and defining k  as the stock of capital per 
effective unit of labor (k K AL = / ) and y as output per effective unit of labor 
( y Y AL = / ), it can be shown that the evolution of k  is governed by (Mankiw et 
al. 1992) 5 
(4)  ( ) dk dt sy n g k / =−+ + δ  , 
and that k  converges to a steady state value 
(5)  () []
( ) ks n g */
/ =+ +
− δ
α 11  . 
Taking the first order Taylor expansion of the right hand side of equation (4) 
and substituting for s using the steady state condition (5) gives (Mankiw 1995) 
(6)  ( ) dk dt k k /* =− − λ  , 
where the rate of convergence to the steady state is given by 
                                           




(7)  () () λ α δ =− + + 1 ng  , 
with α  as the production elasticity of capital (see equation 3). If λ is known to 
be about 2  percent, equation (7) can be used to infer an estimate for α , 
conditional on (ng ++ δ ). 
The standard parameterization suggested in the literature is (ng ++= δ 00 8 .) ,  
with a rate of labor force growth of 1 percent, a rate of technological change of 
2 percent, and a depreciation rate of 5 percent (Barro et al. 1995). Because the 
observed rate of convergence is about 2 percent, equation (7) then would imply 
that α  is about 0.75. 
An implied value of α  of about 0.75 creates a first problem for the traditional 
neoclassical growth model. According to the assumptions of perfect 
competition, which is equal to the assumption of optimal planning in the case of 
a benevolent social planner, and constant returns to scale, α  should equal 
capital's share in income. The average value for α  calculated from the national 
accounts of industrialized countries is about 0.3 (Maddison 1987). But the 
national accounts do not account for human capital formation. Therefore, a 
higher value of α  can be justified as a production elasticity for a broad concept 
of capital that includes physical and human capital (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
1992; Mankiw et al. 1992). Hence, the traditional neoclassical model should be 
augmented by human capital as a third factor of production. 
A second, more serious problem for the traditional neoclassical growth model 
arises from the implicit assumption of capital immobility. While this assumption 
may be a reasonable approximation for cross-country studies, it is rather 
unlikely to hold within countries. Whether regional capital mobility holds for 
socialist economies like China is an empirical question (see below). But with 




the steady state would be high, because capital would move quickly to equalize 
marginal products. 
The theoretical solution for both problems is an open-economy version of the 
neoclassical growth model (Barro et al. 1995) that assumes interregional 
mobility of physical capital flows, but immobile human capital. The human 
capital augmented production function reads 
(8)  () YK HA L =
−− αβ αβ 1      0<α β + <1  , 
where  A grows at rate g and L grows at rate n as before, and H is the level of 
human capital. Calculating the steady state values k * and h* (h H AL = / ) 
similar to equation (5) and substituting them into the production function (8) 
gives the reduced form as 












ln / ΔKY  




ln / ΔHY   , 
where  c equals ln A gt + , and (ΔK Y / ) and (ΔH Y / ) represent the investment 
rates for physical and human capital, which appear as right-hand-side variables 
instead of the respective saving rates in the open economy version of the model. 
Alternatively, combining the steady state equation for h* with equation (9) 
yields 















ln * h    , 
where it is the level of human capital per worker which enters as a right-hand-
side variable, and not the investment rate of human capital as in equation (9). 
For the open economy model, the rate of convergence to the steady state is 




(11)  () λ
β
α




⎠ ⎟ ++ 1
1
 . 
To prove that equation (11) correctly predicts the observed rate of 
convergence, the empirical analysis has two tasks. First, it has to be shown that 
the assumption of physical capital mobility across Chinese provinces is 
reasonable. Second, it has to be shown that conditional on (ng + +δ ), estimated 
production elasticities for physical and human capital can be used to predict a 
rate of convergence of 2.2 percent. 
3.  Estimating the Open Economy Model 
3.1 Capital Mobility across Chinese Provinces 
In China, as in all socialist economies, the fiscal system has traditionally played 
an overarching role in the allocation of investment. In the context of the 
neoclassical growth model, a benevolent social planner could decide on regional 
investment and regional saving in order to produce a welfare maximizing 
convergence of regional output per worker. But China has begun to decentralize 
its fiscal system and allows provincial governments to retain an increasing share 
of the revenue from local economic activity (Raiser 1996). This opens up the 
possibility that the interregional redistribution of capital flows through the fiscal 
system has been reduced. However, fiscal reform in China does not yield a clear 
pattern of decentralization (Zhang and Zou 1996): Budgeting spending became 
more decentralized, but extra-budgeting spending showed an increasing central 
share since 1978; the consolidated central spending share fluctuated and the 
central revenue share increased in 1982-1992. Thus, a benevolent social planner 
would have had the possibility to allocate investment across Chinese province. 
Unfortunately, recent assessments of capital flows within China do not clearly 
show whether they have happened at all and if so, in which direction. The World 




returns to capital across different provinces, suggesting that capital mobility is 
low at best. Raiser (1995) surveys the literature on fiscal decentralization which 
claims that capital mobility across Chinese provinces has declined. Nevertheless, 
Hsueh Tien-tung (1994) reports that during the 1980s the inflow of interregional 
capital to low income provinces has been as high as 25 percent or above of their 
national income, pointing to a rather high interprovincial capital mobility. 
As a first attempt to get a clearer picture, I reproduce data on the fiscal 
balance of Chinese provinces. The underlying data have been calculated by Ma 
(1995a) for 1983 and 1991 and converted to the "percent of GDP" format by 
Raiser (1996). I focus on the data for 1983 which represent a midyear in my 
period of observations spanning 1978 to 1989 (see Table A1). A negative value 
of the fiscal balance indicates that the province has been a net receiver of fiscal 
transfers from the center. 
The idea of a benevolent social planner who allocates investment across 
Chinese regions implies that there is a systematic relation between the flow of 
fiscal resources and the productivity (output per worker) of provinces. As it 
turns out, the correlation coefficients between my measure of fiscal balance in 
1983 and output per worker, either in 1978 or in 1989, are positive and 
statistically significant. For provincial output per worker in 1978, I find a 
correlation coefficient of 0.65 with the fiscal balance in 1983; for output per 
worker in 1989, the correlation coefficient is 0.62.6 
These findings demonstrate that fiscal resources have tended to flow from 
high productivity to low productivity provinces in China in 1978-1989. Since 
the observed correlation is not perfect, this is not to deny that other motives than 
                                           
6   The correlation coefficient between output per worker in 1989 and fiscal balance in 1991 
(not shown in Table A1) is somewhat lower, namely 0.52. This lower correlation may 




regional convergence have also played a role for the redistribution of fiscal 
funds. E.g., a negative fiscal balance may primarily reflect the financing by the 
center of the exploitation of mineral resources or strategic considerations rather 
than an attempt to achieve convergence of regional productivity and, thereby, 
per capita incomes. Nevertheless, the statistically significant positive correlation 
between fiscal balance and output per worker reveals that there is at least some 
empirical support for the assumed allocation mechanism by which capital should 
move from rich to poor provinces. The remaining question is whether the 
present result can be interpreted as capital mobility in the sense of the 
neoclassical model. 
I use the approach suggested by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) to check 
whether the previous positive correlation between fiscal balance and output per 
worker can be interpreted as a form of capital mobility. If Chinese provinces are 
closed economies, their saving rates must equal their investment rates. But if 
they are open, their saving and investment rates could differ due to 
interprovincial capital movements through the fiscal system. Hence, the degree 
of capital mobility can be estimated by a regression of the investment rate 
(I Y / ) on the saving rate (S Y / ) across Chinese provinces: 
(12)  () () IY c SY t
i
t
i // =+ γ    , 
where γ  is the so-called savings retention coefficient. If γ  equals 1, any change 
in the saving rate in province i  leads to an identical change in the investment 
rate of province i . Thus, a γ  of 1 would imply that province i  is a closed 




equals 0, investment and saving rates are uncorrelated at the provincial level. In 
this case, perfect interprovincial capital mobility would prevail.7 
I use average saving and investment rates for various time periods to estimate 
the saving retention coefficient γ  according to equation (12).8 This procedure is 
likely to bias upward the estimate for γ  (Sinn 1992), i.e., towards finding 
capital immobility. However, the results in Table 1 show that saving and 
investment rates across Chinese provinces are uncorrelated since the savings 
retention coefficient is statistically not different from zero in three out of four 
cases. 
The only statistically significant savings retention coefficient arises for 
average saving and investment rates in 1978-1989. However, the estimated 
coefficient is negative and, therefore, is also compatible with the view that 
during the 1980s, the central planning authorities still held a certain power of 
control over the regional distribution of capital accumulation (Hsueh Tien-tung 
1994). Taken at face value, the negative saving retention coefficient implies that 
any increase in the average provincial saving rate would reduce that province's 
investment rate. But since this finding is based on 14 observations only, it may 
                                           
7  Many authors have criticized the Feldstein-Horioka approach by showing that a high 
saving retention coefficient, especially in a time series context, does not necessarily 
imply the absence of capital mobility. By contrast, the interpretation of a statistically 
insignificant saving retention coefficient as an indicator of capital mobility is not 
disputed in the literature. E.g., Montiel (1994) uses the Feldstein-Horioka approach in 
this way and finds a surprisingly high degree of capital mobility for many DCs. For a 
brief survey of the empirical evidence on the relation between saving and investment 
rates from cross-country and inter-regional studies and for the controversies with regard 
to an interpretation of the saving retention coefficient that have arisen in the literature, 
see Feldstein (1994). 




reflect the statistical properties of a special sample and should, therefore, not be 
overinterpreted. The results for the other samples confirm the view that capital 
has been mobile across Chinese provinces. 
Taken together, I interpret my findings as indicating high capital mobility 
across Chinese provinces. High capital mobility would be compatible with a low 
rate of convergence under two scenarios, one empirical and one theoretical. 
First, the economic efficiency of interprovincial capital flows may be low, as 
suggested by Hsueh Tien-tung (1994), or, second, human capital may be less 
mobile than physical capital, as assumed by the neoclassical growth model for 
the open economy. 
If the efficiency of interprovincial capital flows is low, the assumption of a 
welfare maximizing benevolent social planner could not be maintained for a 
consistent interpretation of the empirical facts. But without this assumption, it is 
difficult to explain how China, as a socialist economy, has managed to achieve 
average annual growth rates of real GDP per capita of about 8 percent during the 
1980s (World Bank 1995). Therefore, it may be more useful to employ the 
augmented Solow model for the open economy for an explanation of the 
observed rate of convergence. The empirical relevance of this approach can be 
assessed by estimating production elasticities for physical and human capital 
according to equations (9) and (10). If α  and β  are known, it is possible to 
predict λ according to equation (11). This prediction can be compared with the 
estimated value for λ of 2.2 percent. 
3.2 Production Elasticities for Physical and Human Capital 
The main problem with estimating production elasticities according to equations 
(9) and (10) is that in contrast to flow measures of physical capital formation 
such as the investment rate (I Y / ), direct flow or stock measures of human 




indirect measures of human capital formation. The number of students enrolled 
in secondary education divided by the population (SCHOOL) is my flow 
measure, i.e., this variable is expected to proxy investment in human capital. The 
number of newspapers, magazines, and books published divided by the labor 
force (PUBL) is my stock measure, i.e., this variable is expected to proxy the 
accumulated investment in human capital. As is self-evident, both proxies are 
rather crude measures of human capital formation and, therefore, deserve second 
thoughts. 
Schooling rates (SCHOOL) as a measure of investment in human capital have 
been used in recent international cross section studies of the empirics of 
growth.9 The general idea behind this measure is that variations in the fraction 
of the population devoted to formal education reflect variations in investment in 
human capital. The plausibility of this concept largely depends on the existence 
of different educational systems with different levels of education across the 
units of observation. Thus, this concept is more likely to produce reasonable 
results when applied across countries rather than when applied within countries. 
This is all the more so in the case of a centrally planned economy such as China. 
These considerations raise some doubts on the usefulness of SCHOOL as a 
measure of investment in human capital in the context of Chinese provinces. 
Nevertheless, SCHOOL is used in the following empirical analysis because no 
other proxies for investment in human capital can be derived from the provincial 
statistics in Hsueh et al. (1993). 
Publications per worker (PUBL) as a measure of the stock of human capital 
seems to be even more dubious, at least at first sight. But this is not necessarily 
so. The assumption underlying this concept is that the provincial supply of 
                                           




written information is correlated with the provincial quantity of human capital. 
Since the amount of written information is likely to be dominated by 
newspapers, PUBL will more or less reflect the consumption of newspapers per 
worker at the provincial level. Therefore, this measure may reflect factional 
differences in literacy rates across Chinese provinces which, in turn, may be 
more plausible measures of exogenous interprovincial differences in human 
capital than the reported schooling rates. This is not to deny that PUBL may 
vastly exaggerate the stock of human capital for a given year if publishing grew 
substantially following China's economic reforms. But what matters for the 
estimation of production elasticities is the structure of PUBL across provinces, 
which a priori is unlikely to be biased due to reform efforts. 
Another problem with estimating production elasticities is the statistical 
precision required to be able to draw statistically significant inferences. This is 
all the more so if the production elasticities for physical and human capital turn 
out to be similar to those found for industrialized countries. In this case, the 
predicted convergence rates for the closed and the open economy versions of the 
neoclassical growth model may not differ by much (see Barro et al. 1995), and 
may become indistinguishable for production elasticities estimated with large 
standard errors. 
One way to increase the statistical precision of the estimates is to restrict the 
regression equations (9) and (10). The restriction that can be imposed on 
equation (9) is that the regression coefficients on  ( ) ln ng + +δ ,  () ln / ΔKY, and 
() ln / ΔHY  sum to zero. The restriction that can be imposed on equation (10) is 
that the regression coefficients on  ( ) ln ng + +δ  and  ( ) ln / ΔKY sum to zero. 
Taking into account these empirical modifications, the restricted empirical 
versions of equations (9) and (10) read 
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ln PUBL    . 
Table 2 presents the results of an OLS estimation of these specifications.10 The 
specification with the stock measure of human capital (10a) performs better with 
regard to statistical criteria such as R
2 and p-value than the specification with 
the flow measure (9a). The p-value indicates that the restriction imposed on 
equation (9a) is rejected by the data at the 5  percent level of statistical 
significance, while the restriction imposed on equation (10a) is not rejected. The 
point estimates for α  are not statistically different from each other and their size 
suggests that capital's share in income in China is not that different from 
capital's share in income in industrialized countries.11 However, the point 
estimates for β  differ. If investment in human capital (SCHOOL) is used as a 
right-hand-side variable, β  is estimated to be about 0.16. But if the stock of 
human capital (PUBL) is used as a right-hand-side variable, β  is estimated to 
be 0.46. 
Several reasons exist why the point estimates for β  may differ. First, the 
different estimates may simply reflect that the share of secondary education in 
income as measured by the production elasticity of SCHOOL is much smaller 
than the share of all human capital in income as measured by the production 
                                           
10  The results presented in Table 2 are conditional on the previous assumptions that g equals 
2 percent  and  δ  equals 5  percent. The rate of labor force growth, n, can be directly 
observed for each Chinese province (see Table A1). 




elasticity of PUBL. In this case, the more comprehensive measure is more likely 
to reflect the true impact of human capital formation on output per worker. 
Second, the low estimate for β  derived from the flow specification of human 
capital may be correct, while the high estimate for β  derived from the stock 
specification of human capital may be biased upward due to a correlation 
between  () ln PUBL  and the disturbance term. Such a correlation could arise 
because changes in h, like changes in k, could depend on  y. That is, if the 
accumulation of human capital is correctly described by the same data 
generating process as the accumulation of physical capital (see equation (4)), 
then  () ln PUBL  will be correlated with the disturbance term in equation (10a). In 
this case, an OLS estimate of equation (10a) will produce an upward biased 
estimate of β . 
Third,  PUBLcould be measured with error. This could happen if PUBL is an 
imperfect measure of the true variable, as indicated above. In this case, the true 
impact of human capital formation would even be larger than measured by the 
previous OLS estimate of β  of about 0.46.12 
Fourth, along the same lines, the low estimate for β  derived from the 
investment specification of human capital could also result from a measurement 
error in SCHOOL. A measurement error would tend to bias downward the 
                                           
12    Define the regression coefficients in equation (10a) as  () a =− α α /1  and 
() b =− β α /1 . It follows that  () ( ) ( ) β =− + ba 11 1 / . Thus, a downward biased estimate 




implied point estimate for β .13 In this case, the true impact of human capital 
formation would again be measured by the high estimate for β  derived from the 
stock specification of human capital.14 
I use Hausman's specification error test15 to reveal which of these possibilities 
prevails, i.e., whether or not the covariance between my measures of human 
capital formation and the respective disturbances are zero. The Hausman test 
compares the parameters of the human capital measures derived under two 
alternative estimation techniques, standardized by the difference of the 
covariances of the two estimates. The first estimation by OLS assumes that the 
chosen specification is correct and, therefore, produces consistent results. The 
second estimation by Instrumental Variables (IV) could produce consistent 
results even if the chosen specification is incorrect and, therefore, would 
produce inconsistent results under OLS estimation. The test statistic to be 
derived under these assumptions is asymptotically Chi-squared, with a critical 
value of 6.63 (3.84) for the 1 (5) percent level of statistical significance for 1 
degree of freedom. 
                                           
13    Define the regression coefficients in equation (9a) as  () a = −− α α β / 1  and 
() b =− − β α β / 1 . It follows that  ( ) β = + + ba b /1 . Thus, a downward biased estimate 
of b due to measurement error in SCHOOL  would reduce the point estimate of β .  
14 A further reason for biased regression coefficients could arise from the potential 
correlation between the variable measured with error and other variables in the equation. 
However, this problem does neither arise in equation (9a) nor in equation (10a), because 
both measures of human capital formation are uncorrelated with the measure of physical 
capital formation: The coefficient of correlation between  ( )( ) ln / ln IY n g −+ + δ  and 
() ln SCHOOL ( ) −+ + ln ngδ  is 0.28 with an F-statistic of 2.39; the coefficient of 
correlation between  ()( ) ln / ln IY n g − + +δ  and  ( ) ln PUBL  is 0.15 with an F-statistic of 
0.65. 




I use PUBL as an instrument for SCHOOL and vice versa to see whether 
either  SCHOOL or PUBL is independent from the disturbances in the 
unconstrained versions of equations (9a) and (10a) (see equations 9 and 10). 
Applying the Hausman test to the unconstrained version of equation (9a), I get a 
value of the test statistic of 22.55. This finding suggests that SCHOOL is 
correlated with the error term. Hence, the previous OLS parameter estimate on 
SCHOOL seems to be biased (see Table 2). However, for the unconstrained 
version of equation (10a), I get a value of the test statistic of 3.46. Therefore, the 
hypothesis that PUBL is uncorrelated with the error term cannot be rejected at 
the 5 percent level of statistical significance. 
The results of the specification tests support the previous considerations 
regarding the appropriateness of PUBL and the inappropriateness of SCHOOL 
as measures of human capital formation in the case of China. That is, based on 
comparisons of the OLS results in Table 2, the parameter estimate on PUBL 
does not seem to be biased, at least not to the same degree as the parameter on 
SCHOOL. By contrast, the parameter estimate on SCHOOL seems to be 
downward biased due to measurement error. This leaves open the question how 
large the bias actually is. 
I use an error in variables model to estimate the extent of the downward bias 
in the parameter estimate on SCHOOL. The classical errors in variables model 
amounts to running a reverse regression if one of two explanatory variables is 
measured with error.16 Hence, the variable presumed to be measured with error 
in equation (9a),  ( ) ( ) ln ln SCHOOL n g − + +δ , enters as the dependent variable, 
and  () ln / YL  enters as a right-hand-side variable. As before, the resulting 
regression coefficients can be used to recover point estimates for α  and β . I 
                                           




find a statistically significant point estimate of β  of 0.74 (Table 3), which can 
be interpreted as an upper bound for β . The point estimate for α  is 
inconsistent, but the standard error is large. This result confirms that the 
previous low estimate for β , which can be interpreted as a lower bound, is 
downward biased due to measurement error in my proxy for investment in 
human capital. As it turns out, the average of the lower an upper bound 
estimates of β  from equation (9a) equals the OLS estimate of β  from equation 
(10a), which can be considered as unbiased according to the results of the 
Hausman specification test. 
Notwithstanding the results of the Hausman specification test at the 5 percent 
level of statistical significance, PUBL can only be considered as a rather crude 
proxy of the stock of human capital. To check for the possibility of a potential 
measurement error in  PUBL, I also use the errors in variables model with 
() ln PUBL  as the dependent variable. I find statistically significant point 
estimates for α  of 0.23 and for β  of 0.64 (Table 3). These findings largely 
confirm the results derived from the OLS estimation of equation (10a) (see 
Table 2, second column) with the new point estimate for β  again interpreted as 
an upper bound. This new estimate is statistically indifferent from the lower 
bound OLS point estimate for β of 0.46. 
Taken together, I interpret my findings as confirming the hypothesis that a 
high estimate of β  in the range of 0.46 to 0.64 rather than a low estimate in the 
range of 0.16 is more likely to measure the true impact of human capital 
formation on output per worker in China. The implication of this finding is that 




physical capital accumulation, since α is estimated to be about 0.25.17 Hence, a 
production function that is compatible with my regression results reads 
Y K H L = 02 5 0 02 0 .. 5 5 . . The remaining question is whether the estimated 
production elasticities predict a rate of convergence that closely matches the 
observed rate of convergence of about 2 percent. 
3.3 The Predicted Rate of Convergence 
Once the two production elasticities α  and β  are known, equation (11) 
describes how the predicted rate of convergence can be derived for the case of 
the open economy, conditional on the rate of labor force growth (n), the rate of 
technological change (g), and the depreciation rate (δ ). Of the three 
conditioning parameters, n is the only parameter that can be measured directly. I 
measure  n as the average annual provincial growth rate of the labor force in 
1978-1989, weighted by the labor force in 1989. I find that for my sample, the 
average growth rate of the labor force is 3 percent, so n = 0.03. 
The rate of technological change can only be measured indirectly as a 
residuum, namely as the rate of total factor productivity growth. The problem 
with this procedure is that measured rates of technological change depend on the 
specification of the production function. Jefferson et al. (1992) estimate a 
production function with capital, labor, and intermediate inputs and find a rate of 
technological change of about 2 percent for Chinese state owned industry and of 
about 4 percent for Chinese collective industry. These results may serve as a 
first approximation of g, although human capital accumulation is not taken into 
account and the focus is on technological change in industry rather than in the 
aggregate economy. Another approximation may be derived from the estimates 
                                           




for countries such as Taiwan and South Korea, which experienced similar 
growth rates as China in the 1980s. Taking into account human capital 
accumulation and focusing on the aggregate economy, Young (1995) finds 
average rates of total factor productivity growth of 1.6 percent for South Korea 
and of 2.4  percent for Taiwan. These results suggest that the standard 
parameterization of g of 2 percent may also be reasonable for the case of China. 
That is, I assume that g = 0.02, which is compatible with the findings for 
Chinese industry given that aggregate total factor productivity growth figures 
are usually somewhat lower than industry figures. 
Reliable data on the stock of physical capital and its depreciation are not 
available for China, so the depreciation rate cannot be measured directly as well. 
Given that the share of depreciation in GDP is about 10 percent, which is an 
average figure for industrialized countries (Maddison 1987), the rate of 
depreciation can be calculated once the capital output ratio is known according 
to  () () δ = DY KY / / / . For leading industrial countries such as the United 
States, the capital output ratio is about 3, so δ  would be about 3  percent 
(Mankiw et al. 1992). But for developing countries, it is reasonable to assume a 
smaller capital output ratio. For example, δ  is 5 percent for a capital output ratio 
of 2. Actually, the capital output ratio may be even lower than 2 in developing 
countries, but then the share of depreciation in GDP may also be lower than 
10 percent. On balance, therefore, I assume a depreciation rate of 5 percent for 
China, so δ  = 0.05. 
With these parameterizations for (ng + +δ ), the rate of convergence to the 
steady state can be calculated according to equation (11) as 




















Hence in the case of China, the human capital augmented Solow model for 
the open economy predicts a rate of convergence of output per worker of 
2.7  percent, which is somewhat higher than the actually observed rate of 
convergence of 2.2 percent. However, the difference between the two rates of 
convergence is not statistically significant. What is more, the estimated rate of 
convergence is also not statistically different from the rate of convergence 
predicted for the closed economy, which follows from 
(7a)  λclosed   () () () ( )( ) =− + ++ =− − + +
=
1 1 0 25 0 55 0 03 0 02 0 05
00 2
αβ δ ng .. ...
.
. 
That is, my empirical results are compatible with both the open and the closed 
economy version of the neoclassical growth model. One reason for this outcome 
may be that capital is not perfectly mobile across Chinese provinces. If so, the 
actually observed rate of convergence can be expected to fall within a range 
predicted by the two theoretical borderline cases of perfect capital mobility and 
perfect capital immobility. 
Another reason for less clear-cut results is the statistical imprecision with 
which production elasticities are estimated, which is not surprising for a small 
sample of 29 observations. This statistical imprecision allows for a relatively 
wide range of parameter constellations that can be used for an interpretation of 
results. Put differently, the lower the estimated value of β, the higher the 
predicted rate of convergence and the larger the difference between the rate of 
convergence predicted by the open and by the closed economy versions of the 
neoclassical growth model. 
These empirical ambiguities should be kept in mind when attempting to 
speculate, on the basis of the results, about the impact on regional convergence 
of further economic reforms in China. Further economic reforms are likely to 
increase the fiscal autonomy of provinces despite recent reform efforts by the 




is, provinces with high saving rates will be able to use a higher share of their 
savings for their own investment instead of having to transfer them to provinces 
with low saving rates. In the absence of an efficient domestic capital market, 
fiscal decentralization is, therefore, likely to reduce the extent of interprovincial 
capital mobility. As a result, the rate of convergence of output per worker across 
Chinese provinces can be expected to decline. The open question is the 
quantitative impact on output per worker of a shift from more to less 
interprovincial capital mobility. 
In order to produce empirical benchmarks for the range of the possible 
outcome of such a shift, the two theoretical borderline cases can be 
reconsidered. Taking the point estimates of the production elasticities at face 
value, what seems to be a small difference in terms of convergence rates 
predicted for the closed and the open economy turns out to be a substantial 
difference in terms of adjustment to the steady state. If the convergence rate 
were declining to 2  percent as predicted by the closed economy model, the 
average province would reach halfway to steady state in about 35 years. By 
contrast, if the convergence rate were increasing to 2.7 percent, as predicted by 
the open economy model, the average province would reach halfway to steady 
state in about 26 years. Thus, with the higher convergence rate, halfway to 
steady state could be reached almost half a generation earlier. Assuming a real 
interest rate of 3 percent, this amounts to an output gain of about 30 percent for 
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 Appendix 
All data used in the paper are listed in the two Appendix Tables. The data are 
derived from Hsueh Tien-tung et al. (1993) except for "fiscal balance", which is 
taken from Raiser (1996). My definition of variables is given below. In defining 
variables, I refer to the classification scheme and the definitions given in Hsueh 
Tien-tung et al. (1993).  
1.  Output per worker (YL / ) 
Gross Domestic Product (v1f) in 1989 and 1978, deflated by the Retail Price 
Index (v12a) (rebased to 1978=100), divided by Total Employed Labor 
Force of Society (v5a) in 1989 and 1978. 
2.  Investment rate (I Y / ) 
Total Investment in Fixed Assets (v2b) divided by Gross Domestic Product 
(v1f), averaged for 1978-1989 (Table A1) and other specified time periods 
(Table A2). 
3.  Saving rate (S Y / ) 
Total saving (S) is calculated as a residuum. The first step is to calculate net 
exports (NETEX) as Gross Domestic Product (v1f) minus Total Investment 
in Fixed Assets (v2b) minus Total Consumption (v3a) minus Public 
Expenditures of Local Governments (v4a2). The second step is to calculate 
total saving (S) as net exports (NETEX) plus Total Investment in Fixed 
Assets (v2b). The saving rate is total saving (S) divided by Gross Domestic 
Product (v1f). The saving rate is averaged for 1978-1989 and other specified 
time periods (Table A2). 4.  Labor force growth (n) 
Labor force growth in 1978-1989 is calculated as the growth rate of Total 
Employed Labor Force of Society (v5a) according to 
() [] ln / / va va 551 1 1989 1978  . 
5.  Investment in human capital (SCHOOL) 
Student Enrollment in Secondary School (v13c2) divided by Total 
Population (v6a), averaged for 1978-1989. For Beijing, the entry has been 
estimated according to a regression of  ( ) ln SCHOOL  on  () ln / YL . 
6.  Stock of human capital (PUBL) 
Newspapers, Magazines and Books Published (v14c) divided by Total 
Employed Labor Force of Society (v5a). The entry for Qinghai has been 
revised due to an obvious data error in Hsueh Tien-tung et al. (1993), where 
the entry is 5.5480 for 1989 (p. 501); I use 0.5548 instead. 
7. Fiscal  balance 
Total revenue collected by a province before tax-sharing (excluding net 
transfers to the center) minus total expenditure of a province (including net 
transfers from the center), divided by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Table A1 —  Basic Data for the Regression Analyses 
  Output per worker (Y/L) Fiscal 
balance 
n I/Y  SCHOOL  PUBL 
  1989 1978 1983  Averages  for1978-1989  1989 
  (1978 Rmb)  (1978 Rmb) (percent of 
GDP) 
(percent) (percent) (percent)  (10,000 
copies) 
Anhui 1054  603  -8.7  3.5  21.6  4.7  24.596 
Bejing 3259  2450  11.1  2.9  26.9  9.2  98.775 
Fujian 1377  723  -4.2  3.2  24.2  4.3  42.707 
Gansu 1085  933  -5.1  3.6  24.0  5.1  29.737 
Guangdong 1577  812  -0.4  2.9  24.9  4.7  61.568 
Guangxi 735  522  -4.5  3.1  25.2  3.8  24.976 
Guizhou 736  442  -8.3  3.6  22.4  0.1  21.411 
Hainan 1119  670  -  2.8  29.0  5.2  23.826 
Hebei  1325  868 2.9 3.0  28.2  5.3  26.640 
Heilongjiang 2069  1731  -3.4  3.0 26.6  7.2  69.519 
Henan  1081  580 2.0 3.2  24.0  5.6  27.543 
Hubei  1504  791 4.6 2.2  21.5  5.9  38.607 
Hunan  877  645 1.5 2.8  21.2  5.2  28.272 
Inner Mongolia  1450  859  -16.2  3.0  29.6  6.3  28.892 
Jiangsu  1617  897 9.6 2.5  13.8  5.0  35.338 
Jiangxi 997  694  -2.6  3.1  18.4  4.9  31.703 
Jilin 1519  1270  -3.6  5.1  24.2  7.3  42.254 
Liaoning  2373  1780 9.7 3.6  26.8  6.7  60.814 
Ningxia 1395  913  -25.9  3.7  35.4  6.2  31.328 
Qinghai 1500  1074  -26.9  3.0  46.1  5.6  27.629 
Shaanxi 1107  754  -3.5  3.2  27.9  6.0  31.393 
Shandong 1806  771 4.4 2.6  27.0  5.1  27.690 
Shanghai 4268  3919  38.3  0.8  23.4  5.7  275.772 
Shanxi  1354  912 0.1 2.7  34.3  6.6  51.027 
Sichuan  834  546 1.2 2.8  21.7  4.3  28.692 
Tianjin 3129  2322  14.8  2.3  26.7  6.4  112.826 
Xinjiang 1945  785  -16.7  1.7  36.4  7.2  32.888 
Yunnan 854  526  -5.7  3.3  24.9  3.3  18.398 
Zhejiang  1381  683 7.9 3.1  22.0  4.5  35.871 
Source:  Hsueh Tien-tung et al. (1993); Raiser (1996); own computations. Table A2 —  Average Saving and Investment Rates 
  Average saving rates (percent)  Average investment rates (percent)a 
  1978-1983 1984-1989 1980-1989 1978-1989 1978-1983 1984-1989 1980-1989 
Anhui  23.86 29.40 27.18  NA 15.76 25.58 21.65 
Bejing  47.35 45.96 46.82 46.65 22.09 31.76 28.03 
Fujian  18.63 20.61 19.95  NA 19.85 26.39 24.21 
Gansu  24.56 16.38 19.65  NA 19.40 27.05 23.99 
Guangdong  27.68 34.55 31.89 31.12 19.27 30.62 27.10 
Guangxi  NA  12.05 NA NA NA  25.16 NA 
Guizhou  -1.32  8.99  5.55  NA 21.06 23.00 22.36 
Hainan  NA  30.01  28.43 NA NA  31.19  28.98 
Hebei  37.06 34.69 35.48  NA 27.09 28.74 28.19 
Heilongjiang  34.99 29.76 32.10 32.14 21.34 31.06 27.75 
Henan  31.42 35.64 34.23  NA 19.33 26.36 24.01 
Hubei  33.81 30.31 32.05 32.06 18.93 24.04 21.89 
Hunan  24.91 26.95 26.27  NA 18.28 22.62 21.18 
Inner  Mongolia  NA  4.21  3.27 NA NA  30.81  29.56 
Jiangsu  41.57 44.69 43.50 43.13 10.09 17.45 14.76 
Jiangxi  17.00 24.62 21.57  NA 14.52 21.01 18.41 
Jilin  15.75 17.77 17.09 16.76 21.11 27.26 24.67 
Liaoning  38.78 38.17 38.37  NA 22.04 29.21 26.82 
Ningxia  -5.40  1.30 -0.77 -2.05 28.22 42.59 36.01 
Qinghai  NA  6.13 NA NA NA  46.13 NA 
Shaanxi  15.74 19.44 17.30 17.59 25.01 30.69 28.69 
Shandong  31.42 40.65 37.22 36.04 22.43 31.48 28.11 
Shanghai  69.08 56.76 61.77 62.92 16.13 30.76 25.87 
Shanxi  31.97 33.10 32.72  NA 25.48 38.70 34.29 
Sichuan  NA  23.32  23.93 NA NA  23.51  21.66 
Tianjin  45.20 43.17 43.75 44.10 24.43 28.55 26.81 
Xinjiang  -4.64 10.31  7.24  4.33 34.79 37.55 36.75 
Yunnan  6.35 8.46 8.16 7.61  22.01  26.82  25.23 
Zhejiang  34.04 39.69 38.28 36.87 17.83 26.22 22.87 
aFor average investment rates 1978-1989, see Table A1. 
Source:  Hsueh Tien-tung et al. (1993); own computations. Figure 1 —  Convergence  of  Output  per Worker across Chinese Provincesa, 
1978-1989 



















































a22 provinces, 3 municipalities, and 4 autonomous regions. — bAverage annual growth rate 
of Gross Domestic Product per worker, measured in 1978 prices. — cGross Domestic Product 
divided by Total Employed Labor Force of Society. 
Source: Table  A1. 
 Table 1 —  Saving Investment Regressions across Chinese Provinces 
Time period (t )  Estimated equation: () () IY c SY t
i
t
i // =+ γ  
  γ  
R
2
  No. of observations
1978-1983 -0.12 (0.6)  0.15  24 
1984-1989 -0.12 (0.08)  0.04  29 
1980-1989 -0.09 (0.06)  0.03  27 
1978-1989 -0.18 (0.07)  0.31  14 
Note: Dependent and independent variable are averages for specified time 
periods, standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 2 —  OLS Estimation Resultsa 
  Dependent variable:  () ln / YL  
  Equation (9a)  Equation (10a) 
Constant  7.09 (0.33)  4.62 (0.28) 
()( ) ln / ln IY n g −+ +δ   0.37 (0.32)  0.37 (0.17 
() ( ) ln ln SCHOOL n g −+ + δ   0.26 (0.10)  - 
() ln PUBL   - 0.63  (0.07) 
R
2
  0.23 0.77 
s.e.e.  0.38 0.21 
No. of observations  29  29 
p−value 0.049  0.93 
Implied α   0.23 (0.15)  0.27 (0.09) 
Implied β   0.16 (0.07)  0.46 (0.08) 
aStandard errors in parentheses. Table 3 —  Alternative Estimation Resultsa 
Dependent variable  Errors in variables (reverse regression) 
  () ( ) ln ln SCHOOL n g − + +δ () ln PUBL  
Constant  -6.77 (2.10)  -4.82 (0.91) 
()( ) ln / ln IY n g −+ +δ   0.42 (0.56)  -0.36 (0.24) 
() ln / YL   0.78 (0.30)  1.21 (0.13) 
R
2
  0.21 0.75 
s.e.e. 0.66  0.29 
No. of observations  29  29 
Implied α   -0.31 (0.56)  0.23 (0.11) 
Implied β   0.74 (0.22)  0.64 (0.13) 
aStandard errors in parentheses. 
 